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Reducing Courts’ Failure-to-Appear Rate by Written Reminders
Brian H. Bornstein, Alan J. Tomkins, Elizabeth M. Neeley, Mitchel N. 
Herian, and Joseph A. Hamm
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
This article examines the effectiveness of using different kinds of written re-
minders to reduce misdemeanor defendants’ failure-to-appear (FTA) rates. A 
subset of defendants was surveyed after their scheduled court date to assess 
their perceptions of procedural justice and trust and confidence in the courts. 
Reminders reduced FTA overall, and more substantive reminders (e.g., with 
information on the negative consequences of FTA) were more effective than a 
simple reminder. FTA varied depending on several offense and offender char-
acteristics, such as geographic location (urban vs. rural), type of offense, and 
number of offenses. The reminders were somewhat more effective for Whites 
and Hispanics than for Blacks. Defendants with higher institutional confidence 
and those who felt they had been treated more fairly by the criminal justice sys-
tem were more likely to appear, though the effectiveness of the reminder was 
greatest among misdemeanants with low levels of trust in the courts. The im-
plications for public policy and pretrial services are discussed.
Keywords: Public trust and confidence, Procedural justice, Criminal justice, Field 
experiment
For the law to be effective, people must obey it (Caldeira, 1986; Tyler, 2006b). Al-
though the law frequently involves elements of coercion, in practical terms the le-
gal system has, at best, a limited ability to compel people to obey the law (e.g., 
Rottman, 2007; Tyler, 2006b). Voluntary acceptance minimizes the need for au-
thorities to explain and justify each decision, reduces the need to monitor imple-
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mentation, and limits the expenditure of scarce resources to ensure compliance 
(e.g., Robinson & Darley, 1997; Tyler, 2006a).
One area of the criminal justice system where compliance is particularly lack-
ing is in individuals’ response to orders to appear in court for relatively minor 
offenses such as traffic offenses, misdemeanors, and low-level felonies. Non-
custodial criminal defendants often fail to appear for court. This occurs for 
all kinds of mandated appearances: arraignment, pretrial (postarraignment) 
hearings, trial, and posttrial. Initial (i.e., arraignment) failure-to-appear (FTA) 
rates are particularly problematic, because they involve the greatest volume 
of defendants, most of whom are not detained prior to trial (Goldkamp & 
White, 2006; VanNostrand & Keebler, 2009). There are a number of alterna-
tives to pretrial detention (VanNostrand & Keebler, 2009), the most common 
of which, for minor offenses, is simply to release individuals in the commu-
nity with little or no government oversight, placing the burden to appear in 
court entirely on defendants themselves (Goldkamp & White, 2006). Not sur-
prisingly, this can result in substantial FTA rates. FTA rates vary depending 
on jurisdiction and offense type, ranging from less than 10% (e.g., Cuvelier & 
Potts, 1997; VanNostrand & Keebler, 2009) to as high as 25–30% (e.g., Davis, 
2005; Helland & Tabarrok, 2004; McGinty, 2000). These failures to appear are 
costly for both the court system and defendants (Levin, Kennel, Pellegrino, 
Simmons, & Surett, 2007; Rosenbaum, Hutsell, Tomkins, Bornstein, Herian, & 
Neeley, in press). For example, defendants can incur an additional charge for 
failing to appear, heightened penalties for the instant offense, issuance of an 
arrest warrant, and difficulty in obtaining bail.
Rates for failing to appear are comparatively high for minority defendants com-
pared to Whites (O’Keefe, 2007; White, 2006). A possible explanation for this dif-
ference is that minorities have been found to have lower levels of trust and confi-
dence in the courts (e.g., National Center for State Courts, 1999; Rottman, Hans-
en, Mott, & Grimes, 2003; Rottman & Tomkins, 1999), but little work has examined 
whether these racial and ethnic differences might also be associated with FTA. The 
present study explores the relationship among race and ethnicity, trust and confi-
dence in the courts, and FTA.
Using Reminders to Reduce FTA: An Expectancy Theory Approach
Following the example set by the medical profession (e.g., Larson, Bergman, 
Heidrich, Alvin, & Schneeweiss, 1982), several courts have effectively imple-
mented court reminder programs designed to reduce FTA rates (Crozier, 2000; 
O’Keefe, 2007; White, 2006; see, generally, The Court Brothers, 2010a). For ex-
ample, the Cook County (IL) Juvenile Court’s postcard reminder program re-
duced the FTA rate from 38 to 13% (Circuit Court of Cook County, 2006). Simi-
larly, an evaluation of Coconino County (AZ) showed a reduction in the percent-
age of failures to appear at initial appearance in adult misdemeanor cases from 
over 25 to less than 13% when the defendant was called in advance and remind-
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ed of the hearing date (White, 2006). Reminder programs in Arapahoe County 
(CO), Jefferson County (CO), and Multnomah County (OR) have also increased 
appearance rates and realized substantial labor and financial savings (Arapahoe 
County Justice Center, 2010; Jefferson County Criminal Justice Planning, 2005; 
O’Keefe, 2007), and they show some evidence of a disproportionate benefit for 
minorities (O’Keefe, 2007; White, 2006). The potential of reminder programs has 
even spawned a national reminder call business for courts (The Court Brothers, 
2010b).
Although the results of reminder programs are promising, none to our knowl-
edge has been guided by social scientific theory or research methodology to study 
the matter systematically—that is, comparing different types of reminders to de-
termine which are more or less effective. To make the strongest contribution to 
both scientific theory building and policy development, psycholegal research 
should draw on relevant social scientific theories and research methods (Blumen-
thal, 2002; Wiener, 2007). The present study uses principles of expectancy theory 
(Vroom, 1964) to test the effectiveness of different kinds of written reminders. Pre-
hearing reminders can be used to manipulate defendants’ expectancies regarding 
the negative consequences of failing to appear, as well as the positive consequenc-
es of appearing. Both positive and negative expectancies can motivate choosing 
one behavioral option over another (Vroom, 1964)—here, whether or not to ap-
pear in court.
Although the expected outcomes of court proceedings are somewhat unpredict-
able and idiosyncratic to each case, the procedures themselves are relatively stan-
dardized. Individuals are more likely to accept adverse outcomes and follow un-
wanted directives when they perceive the procedures used to arrive at those out-
comes as procedurally fair (e.g., Hegtvedt, Johnson, Ganem, Waldron, & Brody, 
2009; Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Tyler, 2006a), and when they have high trust and 
confidence in governmental institutions (e.g., Baum, 2006; Gibson, Caldeira, & 
Spence, 2003, 2005).
Perceptions of procedural justice have been examined in a range of contexts, both 
inside and outside the courtroom (e.g., Murphy, 2008; Tomkins & Applequist, 
2008; Tyler, 2007), and they have been studied in both experimental and more nat-
uralistic settings (MacCoun, 2005). Studies looking at procedural justice and com-
pliance typically vary (or assess) the level of procedural justice in some proceed-
ing, and then measure its relationship to subsequent compliance (e.g., Barry & Ty-
ler, 2009; Murphy, 2008; Murphy & Tyler, 2008). Other research focuses on indi-
viduals’ expectancies of procedural justice, and measures its relationship to be-
havioral intentions or attitudes (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988).
In some circumstances, such as court hearings, it is important to address indi-
viduals’ expectancies early in the process, simply because an expectation of low 
procedural fairness or a failure to expect negative sanctions might lead them to 
avoid the court proceeding altogether (i.e., FTA). Thus, the present study seeks to 
manipulate criminal defendants’ expectancies prior to attending their first court 
hearing.
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Study Overview and Hypotheses
Previous literature suggests that reminders would reduce defendants’ FTA rate, 
and that reminders incorporating a substantive message—such as one designed to 
manipulate positive and/or negative expectancies—would be more effective than 
a simple reminder. The present study tests this hypothesis using a two-stage ex-
periment. In Phase 1, defendants were randomly assigned to one of four reminder 
conditions: (a) a no-reminder or control condition; (b) a reminder-only condition; (c) a 
condition in which the reminder also makes them aware of negative consequenc-
es, in the form of possible sanctions, should they fail to appear (reminder-sanctions); 
and (d) a condition in which the reminder mentions sanctions but also highlights 
positive consequences, in the form of the procedural justice elements of voice, neu-
trality, respect, and public interest (reminder-combined). The primary dependent 
variable is whether defendants appear for their scheduled court date.
In Phase 2, we assessed a subset of participants’ trust and confidence in the courts 
and perceptions of procedural justice using a survey administered after their 
scheduled appearance (or nonappearance). This allowed for an examination of the 
possible interaction between the reminder manipulation and participants’ degree 
of trust and confidence.
For Phase 1, we predicted a linear effect of the reminder manipulation, such that 
individuals who received the reminder-combined postcard would be most likely 
to comply, followed by individuals who received the reminder-sanctions postcard, 
followed by participants in the reminder-only condition, who would be more like-
ly to comply with court orders than those who received no reminder. We expect-
ed that the reminder-sanctions condition would be less effective than the remind-
er-combined condition, because some research shows that sanctions alone are not 
a very powerful means to get people to obey the law (Robinson & Darley, 1997). 
Thus, sanctions— or the threat thereof—should be a less efficient means of influ-
encing behavior than other tactics, especially expectancies based on a normative 
rationale (McAdams, 2000). However, one might also reason that members of the 
studied population—individuals charged with breaking the law— would be rela-
tively suspicious about expectancies proffered by the court system, especially pos-
itive expectancies related to fair treatment. If so, then the remindercombined con-
dition might be less effective than it would be with a nonoffending population.
We made two hypotheses related to race and ethnicity, based on prior research 
(e.g., O’Keefe, 2007). First, we predicted a higher FTA rate for minorities than for 
Whites; second, we predicted an interaction between the reminder manipulation 
and defendants’ race and ethnicity, such that the reminders would be effective for 
minority defendants but not necessarily for White defendants.
For Phase 2, we hypothesized that trust and confidence in the judicial system 
and defendants’ procedural justice assessments would be greater for defendants 
who appeared in court than for defendants who failed to appear. We also predict-
ed lower trust and confidence for minorities than for Whites. Finally, we predict-
ed an interaction between the reminder treatment and individuals’ trust and con-
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fidence. Specifically, individuals with high levels of trust and confidence would 
have a high likelihood of complying with court orders, regardless of the treatment 
level that was administered (see, e.g., Scholz & Lubell, 1998; Tyler, 2006b; Tyler & 
Rasinski, 1991). The expectancy of sanctions and/or fair treatment, created by the 
reminder manipulation, would exert a stronger effect in individuals with relative-
ly low trust and confidence in the courts.
Method
Participants
The sample for Phase 1 consisted of 7,865 misdemeanor defendants from 14 coun-
ties in Nebraska. Data collection began in March 2009 and continued through May 
2010. The selected counties included both urban (e.g., Lincoln and Omaha) and 
rural portions of the state. All misdemeanants meeting certain eligibility criteria 
(e.g., age 19 years or older [the age of majority in Nebraska], type of offense, sched-
uling of court hearing) were included in the sample. For example, we excluded of-
fenses for which defendants could waive their court appearance (appearance in 
court is not mandatory for waiverable offenses, which can be handled by the de-
fendant via mail). This included the majority of minor traffic offenses (e.g., sus-
pended license, no proof of insurance) and offenses such as disturbing the peace, 
disorderly conduct, open container, and so on. We also excluded cases that were 
entered into the state court’s computer system too close to the assigned court date, 
because it limited our ability to send a timely reminder. The sample was racially 
diverse: 69.8% White, 10.7% Hispanic; 10.1% Black, 6.6% Unknown; 1.6% Native 
American; 1% Asian American; and .2% Other (racial classifications were made by 
the officer issuing the citation).
All of the misdemeanor categories provided for by state statute were represent-
ed in the sample, with most coming from the relatively severe categories. For ex-
ample, 30.5% of defendants were charged with an alcohol-related misdemeanor 
(e.g., first offense driving-under-the-influence charge) and an additional 31.0% 
were charged with violations of city ordinances (e.g., injuring or destroying prop-
erty). Roughly one sixth (17.6%) were charged with a Class 1 misdemeanor (e.g., 
carrying a concealed weapon, first offense; failing to stop and render aid), with 
the remainder charged with a Class 2 (9.3%; e.g., shoplifting $0$200) or Class 3 
misdemeanor (11.2%; e.g., minor in possession of alcohol). Four individuals were 
charged with a Class 3A misdemeanor (0.1%; e.g., possession of marijuana, third 
offense); 21 were charged with a Class 4 misdemeanor (0.3%; e.g., possession of 
marijuana, second offense); and five were charged with a Class 5 misdemeanor 
(0.1%; e.g., unlawful entry of state park without a park permit). For analytical pur-
poses, we combined the latter three categories with Class 3 misdemeanors.
A subset of the Phase 1 misdemeanants comprised the Phase 2 sample. Specifical-
ly, all of the misdemeanants who did not appear for their hearing and 20% (ran-
domly selected) of those who appeared were sent a survey prenotification one
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week after their scheduled court hearings alerting them to a forthcoming sur-
vey (i.e., we followed Dillman’s [2007] recommended procedures). Two weeks 
after the scheduled hearing dates, participants were mailed the actual survey 
with a $2 bill as an incentive. Replacement surveys were mailed two weeks lat-
er if they had not already been returned. Surveys were sent to 2,357 individ-
uals—1,538 to those who appeared for their court dates and 819 who did not 
appear. We received surveys from 335 defendants who appeared in court and 
from 117 who failed to appear (N  452). The response rate was 21.6% for partici-
pants who appeared in court and 14.5% for those who failed to appear, making 
the overall response rate 19.2%. The demographics of the Phase 2 sample were 
fairly comparable to the Phase 1 sample, although Whites comprised a slight-
ly larger proportion of Phase 2 respondents (77.6%), and Blacks and Hispanics 
comprised slightly smaller proportions than in the Phase 1 sample (7.8% and 
5.7%, respectively).
Materials, Design, and Procedure
Phase 1. Each defendant in the participating counties was randomly assigned to 
one of four conditions (see Table 1): (a) no-reminder or control, (b) reminder-only, 
(c) reminder-sanctions, or (d) reminder-combined. The reminder-only condition con-
sisted of a message printed on a postcard reminding the defendant that he or she 
was scheduled to appear in court on a specified date and time. The reminder-sanc-
tions condition contained this information as well as an explanation of the nega-
tive consequences of failing to appear. The message in the reminder-combined con-
dition contained the same information as the reminder-sanctions condition and it 
also emphasized the various conceptual components of procedural justice (voice, 
dignity, respect, and public interest) that were attendant to the defendant’s ap-
pearance in court.
We did not include a positive-consequences-only condition, with no mention of 
sanctions, because feedback from court personnel suggested that it would be un-
realistic for courts to include the “positive” information without also mentioning 
the “negative” (it would also be potentially unethical, because a positive-only con-
dition might imply an absence of penalties for FTA). The reminders were in a bi-
lingual format (English and Spanish, reverse translated for accuracy) and sent by 
postal mail several days before defendants’ scheduled court appearances. If any 
mailings were returned because of an incorrect address, the individual was imme-
diately removed from the sample.
The messages in the respective conditions were pretested on a separate sample, 
to ensure that the manipulations captured the constructs of interest. Pretest partic-
ipants (n = 55) were recruited from the University of Nebraska- Lincoln psychol-
ogy department online study website (http://www.experimetrix.com) and were 
offered extra credit for completing the survey. Participants were asked to imag-
ine that they had been cited for a misdemeanor and had a court date scheduled, 
and then they completed a questionnaire asking several questions about their ex-
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pectations regarding the fairness of the procedure (e.g., “How likely do you be-
lieve it is that the court [i.e., the judge] would listen to your opinions?” “How 
likely do you believe it is that you would be treated in court with dignity and re-
spect?”). They were then told to imagine that they had received a reminder pri-
or to their court dates (using the language from the reminder-only condition), and 
answered the same questions. Then they saw either the reminder-sanctions post-
card or a reminder describing just the benefits of appearing, followed by the re-
minder-combined condition (with either the negative or the positive information 
presented first, counterbalanced across participants; as described above, we ul-
timately dropped the “positive-only” condition). Thus, they answered the same 
questions for each of four conditions. The reminder-combined condition (with the 
negative sanctions presented first) was perceived as significantly fairer than both 
the control condition, t(28) = 3.35, p = .002, d = .55, and the reminder-only condi-
tion, t(28) = 2.65, p = .013, d = .49. In contrast, the reminder-sanctions condition 
was rated as no fairer than either the control or the reminder-only condition, t(26)
s < 1, ps > .50. These results provided the language for the postcard manipulation 
in the main study.
Phase 2. The survey asked participants to rate how much various factors affect-
ed their decision to appear (or not to appear) in court on 5-point scales, ranging 
from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). They also responded to items assessing confi-
dence in the courts (e.g., “Judges in my county do their jobs well”), cynicism (e.g., 
“People in power use the law to control people like me”), general trust in govern-
mental institutions (e.g., “How often can you trust the U.S. government to do what 
is right?”), obligation to obey the courts (e.g., “I feel I should accept the decisions 
of legal authorities”), and dispositional trust (e.g., “Generally speaking, do you 
think most people can be trusted?”). These constructs measure discrete aspects of 
trust and confidence (Hamm et al., 2011). Responses were made on 5-point scales 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much) or from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strong-
ly agree).
We also asked three questions of all participants relevant to procedural jus-
tice (referred to henceforth as general-PJ), inquiring about their assessments with 
the judicial system in general regarding its fairness, bias, and the respect with 
which they were treated from the time of their ticket to the time they complet-
ed the survey, whether or not they appeared in court (but excluding their expe-
rience with law enforcement personnel, such as the officer who issued the tick-
et). For those who appeared for their hearings, we also asked more extensive-
ly about their procedural justice perceptions regarding their court appearances, 
using an eightquestion scale targeting the subconstructs of fairness, voice, dig-
nity, and respect (referred to henceforth as specific-PJ). Responses were made on 
5-point scales, ranging from 1 (very unfair) to 5 (very fair) or from 1 (very respect-
fully) to 5 (very disrespectfully). Finally, we collected demographic data from each 
participant.
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Table 2
Failure to Appear Rate by Experimental Condition
           Appeared for court
Reminder postcard treatment      No    Yes   Total
 Control     12.6%   87.4%   2095
 Reminder-only    10.9%   89.1%   1889
 Reminder-sanctions     8.3%   91.7%   1901
 Reminder-PJ      9.8%   90.2%   1980
 Total     10.4%   89.6%   7865 
Results
Phase 1
FTA rate and case disposition. The baseline (control) FTA rate was 12.6%; it was 
10.4% across all conditions. For defendants who appeared in court, there were a 
number of possible case dispositions. For all defendants, 78.8% pleaded guilty in 
court, while the charge was dismissed in 11.6% of cases. An additional 6.2% plead-
ed guilty by waiver.1 Only 3.4% of cases went to trial; of these, nearly all were 
bench trials.
FTA across conditions. The FTA rate varied significantly across conditions (see 
Table 2), χ2(3) = 20.90, p < .001, Φ = .05. Post hoc contrasts showed a difference be-
tween receiving any reminder (9.7% FTA rate) versus the noreminder control con-
dition, χ2(1) = 14.29, p < .001, Φ = .04. There was also a significant difference be-
tween the simple reminder and the two conditions with more substantive infor-
mation (i.e., reminder-sanctions and reminder-combined), χ2(1) = 4.63, p = .031, Φ 
= .03. The FTA rate was slightly higher in the reminder-combined condition than 
in the reminder-sanction condition, but this difference was not statistically signif-
icant, χ2(1) = 2.60, p = .11, Φ = .03.
Table 3
Regression Results: Factors Associated With Failure to Appear
   Variable          β (SE)     Wald   Exp(b)    95% CI
Reminder treatment       .14* (.08)      2.96     1.14  [0.98, 1.34]
Race        -.09 (.09)      1.00       .91  [0.77, 1.09]
Reminder treatment by race      -.01 (.05)       .06       .99  [0.90, 1.09]
Gender        -.10 (.09)      1.13       .91  [0.76, 1.08]
Urban/rural        .41** (.11)    13.44     1.50  [1.21, 1.86]
Offense type      -.18** (.03)    42.71       .83  [0.79, 0.88]
Number of offenses   -1.28** (.10)  172.86       .28  [0.23, 0.34]
Constant      4.48 (.34)   177.47   87.90
Note. Cox & Snell R2 = .044.
* p = .085. ** p < .001.
1 We were unable to obtain disposition data on approximately 16% of the cases. Also, as noted above, all waiv-
erable offenses and traffic cases were removed from our sample before reminder postcards were mailed to defen-
dants, which raises the question of how cases in the sample could be disposed of by waiver. Most of the cases dis-
posed through a waiver were originally nonwaiverable cases that were amended by the courts. Finally, a number 
of waiverable cases at the city level appear to have been inadvertently included in the sample because our screen-
ing criteria were based on state statutes rather than city ordinances.
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Table 4
Failure to Appear Rate by Offense Type
  All     Reminder  Reminder  Reminder
  conditions  Control   only   sanctions   combined
  FTA   FTA   FTA   FTA   FTA
Offense type  rate  n  rate  n  rate  n  rate  n  rate       n
Class 1   7.6  1377  7.3  358  8.2  365  7.0  330  8.0       324
Class W (alcohol)  9.4  2389  9.7  628  11.1  96  7.2  567  9.4       598
Class 2   13.8 732  18.9  212  11.7  145  10.5  191  13.0     184
Class 3/3A/4/5  8.4  908  10.2  254  8.5  213  6.8  220  7.7     2212
City ordinance  12.9  2424  17.5  636  13.2  560  10.1  587  10.6     641
Note. FTA rates are percentages. The Method section gives examples of each offense type.
Factors associated with FTA. Secondary analyses focused on differences in FTA 
rate as a function of several factors, specifically (a) defendants’ race and ethnicity, 
(b) defendant sex, (c) geographic location (specifically, rural vs. urban counties), 
(d) offense type, and (e) number of charges. To explore these relationships, we es-
timated a logistic regression model with all of these factors as predictors of the 
overall FTA rate as well as reminder condition. The model also included the pre-
dicted interaction between reminder and race/ethnicity (see Table 3).
Controlling for these other factors, the effect of the reminder manipulation was 
reduced, but was still marginally significant, β = .14, p = .085. This suggests that 
the reminders were still effective, but that FTA was also associated with some of 
the other factors included in the regression model, as discussed next. We predict-
ed that minorities would have higher FTA rates than Whites. The overall FTA (all 
conditions combined) rate varied as a function of defendant race and ethnicity: 
White (9.5%) versus Black (16.4%) versus Hispanic (9.4%). However, when con-
trolling for sex, location, offense type, and number of charges, the effect of race 
and ethnicity was not significant, β = -.09, p = .32.
The FTA rate also did not differ significantly as a function of defendant sex: Male 
(10.8%) versus Female (9.4%), β = -.10, p = .29. The FTA rate varied across geo-
graphic locations and was higher in urban (12.4%) than rural counties (6.8%), β = 
.40, p < .001. We also examined whether FTA rates differed by the type of offense 
and by the number of charges issued for each court hearing. FTA rates differed 
significantly as a function of the type of offense (see Table 4),  β =-.18, p < .001. In-
dividuals charged with Misdemeanor 2 offenses and violations of city ordinances 
were the most likely to FTA.
Figure 1. FTA rates by race and reminder condition.
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FTA rates also differed significantly depending on the number of charges issued 
on each ticket (coded as 1 vs. 2 or more), with the likelihood of FTA increasing 
with the number of citations on the ticket, β = -1.28, p < .001. Only 5.4% of individ-
uals with one offense failed to appear, whereas 15.4% of individuals with two or 
more offenses did not appear. Based on the results of this analysis, and in relation 
to the other analyses conducted above, it appears that number of offenses is one of 
the strongest predictors of FTA.
Differential effectiveness of reminders by race and ethnicity. We predicted that 
the postcard reminders would be effective for minorities but not for Whites (i.e., 
a race by reminder interaction). The interaction between race and reminder was 
nonsignificant, β = -.01, p = .80. Thus, the effectiveness of the reminders was es-
sentially comparable for the three major racial groups (see Figure 1). However, be-
cause we predicted an effect for minorities but not for Whites, we examined treat-
ment effects for each racial and ethnic group separately.
For Whites, the FTA rate ranged from 11.7 to 8%, depending on the treatment, a 
finding that was significant, χ2(3) = 12.26, p = .007, Φ = .05. Follow-up tests com-
paring each reminder condition to the control condition showed that the remind-
er-sanctions condition was effective, χ2(1) = 10.78, p = .001,.06, as was the remind-
er-combined condition, χ2(1) = 6.21, p = .013, Φ = .05; however, the reminder-only 
condition did not greatly reduce FTA among Whites, χ2(1) = 2.94, p = .086, Φ = .03.
For Blacks, the various treatments did not appear to have the same effect. The 
FTA rate for Blacks ranged from 18.7% in the control condition to 13.5% in the re-
minder-sanctions condition, but the omnibus test was not significant, χ2(3) = 3.85, 
p = .28, Φ = .07. For Hispanics, there was a marginally significant difference in FTA 
rate across the conditions, χ2(3) = 6.81, p = .078, Φ = .09.
As with Whites, the reminder with sanctions had the greatest absolute impact on 
reducing FTA rates, given that the FTA rate was reduced to 4.7 from 10.5% in the 
control condition, χ2(1) = 4.94, p = .026, Φ = .11. The other reminders did not signif-
icantly reduce FTA below the baseline level among Hispanics, χ2(1)s < 2, ps > .5.
Phase 2
In a previous study, we found that our trust and confidence items could be sta-
tistically and conceptually organized into four distinct subscales (Hamm et al., 
2011): Trust in the Courts, Cynicism, General Trust in Institutions, and Obligation 
to Obey. Here we present data from the Trust in the Courts subscale (α = .85), as 
well as a Total Institutional Confidence measure (combining all four subscales; α 
= .77), because those are most relevant to the present study. Because the construct 
of Dispositional Trust is conceptually different from a person’s perceptions about 
institutions (i.e., it looks at people’s general trust of others), we examined this con-
struct separately (α = .78).
We also measured defendants’ perceptions of procedural justice. We asked all de-
fendants three general questions about courts’ fairness, bias, and respect related to 
the judicial system in general (general-PJ). We also asked the defendants who ap-
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peared for their hearings (n = 251) eight questions about their case-specific proce-
dural justice perceptions (specific-PJ). Alpha levels for both PJ scales were fairly 
high (.92 and .82, respectively). There was a strong relationship between the two 
sets of questions, each treated as a scale, r(324) = .66, p < .01.
Trust and confidence, PJ, and FTA. We hypothesized that those defendants who 
appeared for their hearings would indicate greater levels of trust and confidence 
and have greater levels of perceived procedural justice than those who did not ap-
pear. Defendants who appeared in court for their hearing had significantly great-
er Total Institutional Confidence scores (M = 3.24) than those who did not appear 
(M = 3.02), F(1, 445) = 7.82, p = .005,  = .02, as well as greater Trust in the Courts 
scores (M = 3.30 for appearers; M = 3.04 for nonappearers), F(1, 441) = 7.78, p = 
.006,  = .02. Additionally, there was a relationship between perceptions of (gen-
eral) procedural justice and appearance, F(1, 438) = 6.61, p = .01,  = .02, such that 
those who appeared for their hearings perceived greater levels of procedural jus-
tice in their overall experience with the criminal justice system (M = 3.53 vs. M = 
3.23).
We also discovered strong relationships between the various constructs of inter-
est. For example, the correlation between Total Institutional Confidence and gen-
eral-PJ was significant r(440) = .59, p < .001, as was the correlation between Trust 
in the Courts and general-PJ, r(438) = .65, p < .001. Furthermore, among those who 
appeared for court, there were strong relationships between Total Institutional 
Confidence and specific-PJ, r(324) = .57, p < .001, and between Trust in the Courts 
and specific-PJ, r(323) = .64, p < .001.
We next examined the potential relationships between the reminder manipula-
tion and perceptions of general and specific procedural justice. The results showed 
no effect in either case, F(3, 436) = 1.15, p = .33,  = .01, and F(3, 320) = .44, p = .72, 
 = .00, respectively.
We hypothesized that there would be a race and ethnicity effect, with Whites 
having greater trust and confidence than minorities. Comparing Whites, Blacks, 
and Hispanics, there were significant differences on a number of constructs relat-
ed to trust (see Table 5). Whites had greater dispositional trust than both Blacks 
and Hispanics, F(2, 401) = 9.20, p < .001,  =  .04. Notably, we also found that there 
was a significant difference across the three racial and ethnic categories on Total 
Table 5
Trust and Confidence and Procedural Justice Scale Means by Race and Ethnicity
         Whites        Blacks     Hispanics
Scale    Mean   SD  Mean   SD  Mean   SD    F   p 
Trust in the Courts   3.26a  0.84  2.79b  0.91  3.24a,b  0.87  4.34  .014
Total Institutional Confidence 3.20a  0.70  2.84b  0.81  3.15a,b  0.66  3.71  .025
Dispositional Trust   2.90a  0.80  2.34b  1.02  2.44b  0.89  9.20  .000
General Procedural Justice  3.35  1.04  3.13  1.31  2.99  0.98  0.23  .795
Specific Procedural Justice  3.47  1.04  3.38  1.13  3.35  1.03  1.34  .264
Note. Within a row, means with different superscripts—a and b—differ significantly, p < .05.
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Figure 2. FTA rates as a function of trust in the courts and reminder treatment.
Institutional Confidence, F(2, 402)  3.71, p = .025,  =.02, and Trust in the Courts, 
F(2, 398) = 4.34, p = .014,  = .02. Post hoc tests showed that on both variables, the 
significant difference was driven largely by the gap between Whites and Blacks 
rather than any differences between Whites and Hispanics, or between Blacks 
and Hispanics. Together, the findings suggest that although Blacks differed from 
Whites on all measures of trust and confidence, Hispanics were closer to Blacks on 
some measures, but closer to Whites on others.
Finally, we hypothesized that the level of trust and confidence would interact 
with the reminder manipulation, such that the reminder would be more effective 
for defendants relatively low in trust. We conducted a binary logistic regression 
to examine this hypothesis, with appearance as the dependent variable. Because 
the Phase 1 analyses showed that the largest effect was for receiving any reminder 
versus the control condition, we dichotomized the reminder variable (i.e., any re-
minder vs. none); trust in the courts was categorized as low, medium, or high; and 
we controlled for participants’ race using dummy variables.
The results (see Figure 2) revealed that, consistent with the results reported above, 
higher levels of trust in the courts were associated with a greater probability of ap-
pearing, β = 0.79, p = .008, Exp(b) 2.21, Exp(b) CI [1.23, 3.94]. As in the Phase 1 
Table 6
Reasons for Appearance or Nonappearance
Reason          Mean  SD
Reason for appearance
I wanted to avoid an additional offense (for failure to appear) on
my record.         4.60  1.02
I wanted to avoid additional penalties.       4.59    .98
I felt I should obey the law.        4.38  1.05
The system depends on compliance from people like me.     3.73  1.37
I wanted to tell my side of the story.       3.16  1.62
Reason for nonappearance
I had scheduling conflicts.        2.77  1.81
I had work conflicts.        2.39  1.66
I had transportation difficulty.       2.07  1.59
I forgot about the hearing date.       1.89  1.50
I had family conflicts (e.g., childcare conflicts).      1.84  1.44
I was afraid of what the outcome would be if I went to court.    1.72  1.20
Note. The scale ranged from 1 (affected not at all) to 5 (affected very much). Ns ranged from 317–325 for appearers 
and from 109–113 for nonappearers.
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analysis of the full sample, there was also an effect of the reminder manipulation, 
such that the FTA rate was lower for those who received a reminder than for those 
who did not, β = 1.32, p = .045, Exp(b) = 3.73, Exp(b)CI [1.03, 13.51]. Supporting our 
hypothesis, there was also a significant interaction, β =-.70, p = .039, Exp(b) = .50, 
Exp(b) CI [.26, .97]. As Figure 2 shows, the reminder marginally reduced FTA for 
those with low trust in the courts (p = .05, one-tailed), but it did not affect FTA for 
those with medium (p = .28) or high (p = .10) trust. Put another way, the reminder 
eliminated differences in FTA as a function of degree of trust in the courts.
Reasons for (non)appearance. We also examined why defendants did or did 
not appear for their court appearance (see Table 6). The factors that participants 
judged most important in their deciding to appear for court were wanting to avoid 
additional offenses for FTA or additional penalties, or feeling they should obey the 
law. In contrast, defendants who did not appear rated scheduling conflicts as hav-
ing the greatest effect on their decision. Notably, nonappearers did not seem to 
view forgetting their hearing date, family conflicts, or fear of the outcome as ma-
jor reasons for their nonappearance.
Discussion
The Phase 1 findings replicate previous research in showing that a reminder ef-
fectively reduces the FTA rate. A more substantial reminder, containing informa-
tion about possible sanctions for FTA, was more beneficial than a simple remind-
er, suggesting that the expectation of negative consequences modified defendants’ 
behavior (Vroom, 1964). However, inclusion of a more positive expectancy mes-
sage, derived from procedural justice principles, did not yield additional benefit. 
Indeed, there was some indication that the reminder with only negative, threat-
ening information (i.e., the reminder-sanctions condition) was the most effective 
method of reducing FTA rates for all three racial groups we examined (the sanc-
tions condition reduced the FTA rate by 3.7% for Whites, 5.2% for Blacks, and 5.8% 
for Hispanics; these reductions were statistically significant for Whites and His-
panics, but not for Blacks).
The effectiveness of the reminder with sanctions was surprising, inasmuch as re-
search shows that sanctions alone are not a very powerful means to get people to 
obey the law (Robinson & Darley, 1997). In addition to this finding, the analysis 
of participants’ reasons for (non)appearance likewise showed a greater emphasis 
on instrumental than on normative concerns, especially among nonappearers. It is 
possible that the decision-making calculus is different in an offending population, 
and that the threat of sanctions in particular, and instrumental considerations gen-
erally, are particularly effective for this group—perhaps due to greater lifetime ex-
perience with clear behavioral contingencies, especially of a punitive nature, than 
with more abstract, normative reasoning.
FTA differed as a function of demographic and offense characteristics, especial-
ly geographic location (urban vs. rural), offense type, and number of charges. The 
difference between urban and rural communities likely reflects the greater sense 
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of anomie and disconnectedness in urban centers, compared to more closely knit 
rural settings (Curry, 2000). The FTA rate did not differ across race and ethnicity 
when controlling for these other factors. Racial and ethnic minorities are quite di-
verse, and it is problematic to focus on race without consideration of variables that 
might covary along with race (e.g., Covington, 1995; Hitlin, Brown, & Elder, 2007). 
Furthermore, the fact that 54.9% of the Hispanic sample came from rural areas 
might suggest that rural Hispanics are particularly aware of the sanctions associ-
ated with FTA. The data on offense type and number of charges suggest that FTA 
is more likely for more serious cases (i.e., more severe offenses, multiple charges; 
VanNostrand & Keebler, 2009).
The most striking finding from Phase 2 was that trust and confidence correlated 
significantly with court appearances. This finding is consistent with other dem-
onstrations that trust and confidence are an important construct for understand-
ing compliance with the law generally (Murphy, 2008; Scholz & Lubell, 1998). It 
is also relevant to understanding racial and ethnic differences in compliance (e.g., 
Brooks & Jeon-Slaughter, 2001; Tyler, 2001). Minorities tend to have less trust in 
various authorities than Whites (e.g., the medical system as well as the legal sys-
tem; see Corbie-Smith, Thomas, & St. George, 2002). In our dataset, the race effect 
was not uniform: Blacks and Hispanics were similar in dispositional trust (and 
different from Whites), but Hispanics resembled Whites in their confidence in the 
courts and total institutional confidence. Hispanics were also similar to Whites in 
FTA, suggesting that situation-specific trust and confidence measures may be bet-
ter predictors of racial and ethnic differences in compliance than more stable, dis-
positional measures. Other research has similarly found that Hispanics are inter-
mediate between Whites and Blacks in their attitudes toward legal authorities, 
such as police (Weitzer & Tuch, 2006).
We also found support for the expected interaction between the reminder manip-
ulation and trust in the courts, with evidence that a reminder was most effective 
for defendants relatively low in trust. Indeed, the relationship between trust in the 
courts and (non)appearance disappeared when defendants received a reminder. 
Thus, reminders have the potential to equalize appearance rates for defendants 
who vary in their attitudes toward the criminal justice system.
Limitations and Future Directions
One limitation of this study is whether the message in the reminder-combined 
condition was sufficiently potent. Pretesting of the postcard manipulation indi-
cated it was significantly different from the other postcard reminders. However, 
the pretesting was done with a college student sample. Compared to nonoffend-
ers, actual defendants might have been more skeptical about the positive aspects 
of the message (i.e., voice, respect, etc.), particularly if they had had bad experienc-
es with the criminal justice system in the past. Indeed, there was evidence of sub-
stantial cynicism in the Phase 2 sample, with those failing to appear being signifi-
cantly more cynical than those who appeared.
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It is unclear how to overcome this limitation, as an even stronger message would 
likely be met with the same cynicism. It is possible that a telephone reminder from 
court personnel emphasizing positive expectancies could accomplish this goal, but 
it would be offset by the substantial additional investment of labor and time. Pre-
recorded telephone reminders are potentially more efficient, but any added bene-
fit of a phone reminder might only accrue from a “live” individual who could pro-
vide a more personal touch and also answer questions. Future research should di-
rectly compare print versus phone reminders, taking into account the costs as well 
as the benefits of reduced FTA (Rosenbaum et al., in press).
One alternative solution is simply to accept that negative messages might be more 
effective at changing expectancies and inducing desirable behavior in this context 
than positive messages. For example, recent field experiments have shown that 
shame can work as a potentially powerful “commitment device” that motivates 
people to act prosocially, work toward long-term strategies, and engage in civic 
activities (deHooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008; Gerber, Green, & Larimer, 
2010). Perhaps lessons from such field experiments can inform future efforts to un-
derstand compliance with both civic duties and legal obligations.
In addition to these limitations to the reminder manipulation, there were lim-
itations to the Phase 2 survey. For example, it did not include measures of per-
ceived outcome favorability or outcome fairness, which are themselves important 
determinants of perceived procedural fairness (Bornstein & Dietrich, 2007; Skit-
ka, Winquist, & Hutchinson, 2003). In measuring procedural fairness only after 
the court hearing—due to the close proximity of the scheduling process to the 
actual hearing dates—it was impossible to measure positive expectancies before 
the court date; this is an important limitation that should be addressed by future 
research. Nonetheless, a large majority (84.4%) of participants correctly reported 
that they had received (and presumably read) a reminder postcard. This does not 
show whether the manipulation actually affected their expectancies, but in combi-
nation with the finding that the reminder information about negative consequenc-
es affected appearance rates, it does suggest that participants processed the ma-
nipulation as intended.
Future research should also extend the racial and ethnic findings of the present 
study. The sample contained too few Native Americans, despite being double the 
statewide percentage, as well as too few Asian Americans, to address FTA in these 
groups. Larger-scale research could target areas in states with large populations of 
Native Americans and Asian Americans. On the other hand, defendants from the 
rural counties in our sample contained a substantial number of Hispanics (16.6%). 
This diversity provides valuable information about rural Hispanics in the United 
States, because there is a general lack of research on this population, which makes 
up an increasing proportion of rural populations across the United States (Kandel 
& Cromartie, 2004).
Finally, future research should address the effectiveness of reminders at reducing 
FTA among felony defendants. Felony defendants are less likely than misdemean-
or defendants to have the opportunity to FTA, because they are often in custody; 
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nonetheless, many felony defendants awaiting trial are released on bond. On the 
one hand, they might be more likely to appear, because the penalty for FTA (e.g., 
forfeited bail) is potentially greater. On the other hand, they might be less likely 
to appear, because the prospect of a stiffer sentence if they are tried and convicted 
could give them greater incentive to flee. Our finding that defendants with more 
charges—and hence stiffer potential penalties—were less likely to appear suggests 
that this latter expectation is more likely.
Implications for Criminal Justice Policy and Practice
Despite these limitations, the study has important implications for criminal jus-
tice policy and practice, such as improving system efficiencies and cost savings 
through better compliance, improving criminal defendants’ perceptions of the 
courts, and reducing racial and ethnic disparities in the criminal justice system. 
FTA rates vary widely across jurisdictions, but even lower-end estimates in the 
10% range (e.g., VanNostrand & Keebler, 2009)—which are consistent with the 
overall FTA rate in the present sample (12.6% in the control condition)—are cost-
ly for both defendants and the court system as a whole (Levin et al., 2007). Reduc-
ing FTA rates, by even a few percentage points, can have significant financial and 
labor savings (O’Keefe, 2007; Rosenbaum et al., in press). Another benefit of low-
er FTA rates might be additional revenue in the form of fines collected from defen-
dants who do appear.
Knowing which types of misdemeanants are most likely to FTA—such as those 
in urban locales, with multiple charges, or cited for certain offenses—has impli-
cations for how to allocate pretrial services most efficiently. The present findings 
suggest that targeting defendants with multiple charges or in urban centers using 
a reminder program would yield the biggest “bang for the buck.” The observation 
that the threat of sanctions is especially effective in reducing FTA in the context of 
misdemeanor level offenses could be used to reduce FTA in other contexts, such as 
reducing the number of citizens who do not respond to their jury summons (Selt-
zer, 1999), or decreasing failure to pay child support.
The findings can also help in developing programs that better estimate the im-
pact that various court interventions will have on reducing FTA. The literature on 
pretrial service programs’ ability to reduce FTA and to ensure community safety is 
relatively small. In addition to the utility for practitioners in the implementation of 
programs, being able to quantify the impact of pretrial service program interven-
tions also improves the predictive power of pretrial risk assessment instruments, 
such as those that calculate latent risk (Bhati, 2010).
In the present study, defendants who appeared for court had greater trust in the 
courts and perceived that they were treated with greater fairness and respect from 
the time of their ticket to the time they completed the survey, compared to nonap-
pearers. Trust and confidence in legal institutions, which is closely related to, yet 
arguably distinct from, procedural justice (Rottman, 2007; Tyler, 2006a, 2006b), has 
been identified by both researchers (e.g., Benesh, 2006; Rottman et al., 2003; Ty-
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ler, 2006b) and members of the judiciary (e.g., O’Connor, 1999) as important. Ef-
forts to increase trust and confidence—especially in populations likely to offend—
could potentially yield lower FTA rates (the observed correlation between trust/
confidence and appearance does not, of course, necessarily imply a causal rela-
tionship).
Outreach efforts by the courts are one way to accomplish this goal (National Cen-
ter for State Courts, 2005). Indeed, when it comes to reducing the overrepresen-
tation of minorities in the criminal justice system, community-based outreach ef-
forts—such as investing resources in local institutions and social services—are 
likely to be more effective than “law-and-order” measures at increasing trust in 
the courts and other governmental institutions among groups, such as African 
Americans, with relatively low trust (Roberts, 2004; Weitzer & Tuch, 2006). In-
creased trust, then, would be associated with greater compliance.
Conclusion
This study demonstrates that it is possible to reduce the risk of FTA with a post-
card reminder system. Substantive reminders—that is, those with information 
about possible sanctions—were more effective than a simple reminder. FTA rates 
varied across a number of offender characteristics, such as geographic location 
(rural vs. urban), offense type, and number of charges. FTA was highest for Blacks, 
but this difference was not statistically significant when controlling for these oth-
er factors. Reminders were somewhat less effective for Blacks than for Whites and 
Hispanics.
Misdemeanor defendants who appeared in court had more confidence in the 
courts and a greater sense of procedural justice than defendants who did not ap-
pear. There was evidence that the reminder manipulation’s effectiveness varied 
as a function of defendants’ level of trust and confidence, suggesting that raising 
trust and confidence could be reasonably expected to reduce FTA. Overall, the 
present study shows promise that there are ways of ameliorating the costly prob-
lem of FTA.
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